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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant Roberta Ronique Bell was convicted following a 
jury trial of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; 
murder of a witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A) 
and (C); use of physical force and threats against a witness, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), (2), and (3); and use 
of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). She was sentenced to 
life imprisonment. These charges all relate to the killing of 
Doreen Proctor, who had been acting as an informant for 
the Tri-County Drug Task Force. Before Bell was indicted 
on these federal charges in June 1995, she had been 
acquitted in the Court of Common Pleas for Adams County 
of murder and witness intimidation charges arising out of 
the same events. 
 
Bell's principal argument in this appeal is that her 
convictions on the witness tampering charges must be 
reversed because there was insufficient evidence that she 
intended to interfere with a federal proceeding or to prevent 
the communication of information to federal law 
enforcement officers. We hold that the jury was entitled to 
conclude (1) that Bell intended to prevent communications 
by Proctor to law enforcement officers and (2) that under 
United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909 (3d Cir. 1996), at 
least one of those communications would have been to a 




Doreen Proctor was an informant for the Tri-County Drug 
Task Force ("the Task Force"), which was comprised of 
local, state, and federal investigators operating in 
Cumberland, Dauphin, and Franklin Counties in 
Pennsylvania. The Task Force had developed federal as well 
as state criminal cases. Based on an investigation by the 
Task Force in which Proctor had provided information, 
David Tyler (who was Bell's boyfriend and colleague in the 
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drug business) was on trial for drug offenses in state court. 
Proctor was scheduled to testify against Tyler on April 21, 
1992, in the Court of Common Pleas for Cumberland 
County. In the early morning of April 21, at the direction of 
David Tyler, Bell and several others kidnapped Proctor, 
took her to an isolated location in Adams County, tortured 
her, and killed her. Bell drove Proctor to the place where 
she was killed, and fired the first shot, into Proctor's chest. 
Willie Tyler, David Tyler's brother, then shot Proctor in the 
head. 
 
Several of Bell's co-conspirators were convicted in state 
court of murder and/or witness intimidation. Bell, however, 
was acquitted in April 1993. Federal authorities then began 
their own investigation into Proctor's murder, which 
culminated in the convictions that are the subject of this 
appeal.1 
 
Before trial, Bell moved to dismiss the indictment on 
double jeopardy and related grounds. The district court 
denied this motion in September 1995. Following trial, Bell 
moved for judgment of acquittal or a new trial, renewing 
her double jeopardy argument and contending that there 
was insufficient evidence to sustain her convictions on the 
witness tampering charges because Proctor was not a 
federal witness. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of 
the evidence, Bell contended that the court erred in its 
charge to the jury on the issue of her intent to interfere 
with a federal proceeding or investigation. She also 
advanced the related argument that without a connection 
between Proctor and a federal proceeding or a federal 
investigation, the court lacked jurisdiction. The court 
denied this motion in a memorandum opinion filed in June 
1996. At her sentencing hearing, Bell argued that it was 
error to use the first-degree murder guideline in computing 
her sentence on the 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a) intimidation count 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Willie Tyler is the only co-conspirator of Bell's to have been similarly 
prosecuted in federal court after the state prosecution. He was acquitted 
of murder and convicted of witness intimidation in the state trial, and 
served two years in prison. He was then convicted of the same offenses 
as Bell following a trial in the Middle District of Pennsylvania (No. 1:CR- 
96-106). 
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(as the pre-sentence report recommended) because the jury 
never determined that Bell committed first-degree murder. 
The court rejected this argument. (App. 21A-30A) 
 
On appeal, Bell raises these same contentions. In 
evaluating Bell's sufficiency challenge, we must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the government (the 
verdict-winner) and ask "whether any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 
711, 731 (3d Cir. 1994). Since the remainder of Bell's 





Subsection (a)(1) of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 ("Tampering with a 
witness, victim, or an informant") makes it unlawful to kill 
or attempt to kill another person "with intent to -- (A) 
prevent the attendance or testimony of any person in an 
official proceeding; [or] (C) prevent the communication by 
any person to a law enforcement officer or judge of the 
United States of information relating to the commission or 
possible commission of a Federal offense . . . ." Subsection 
(b) of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 prohibits the knowing use of 
intimidation, physical force, threats, and corrupt 
persuasion to accomplish these ends. 
 
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1) defines an "official 
proceeding" as a federal proceeding, whether before a court, 
a grand jury, Congress, or a government agency. Similarly, 
18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(4) defines a "law enforcement officer" as 
"an officer or employee of the Federal Government, or a 
person authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal 
Government . . . ." While the statute thus limits its reach 
to tampering that affects a federal proceeding or 
investigation, it expressly does not require that the 
defendant know or intend anything with respect to this 
federal character. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f) provides: "no 
state of mind need be proved with respect to the 
circumstance -- (1) that the official proceeding before a 
judge [or] court . . . is before a judge or court of the United 
States . . . or (2) that the . . . law enforcement officer is an 
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officer or employee of the Federal Government or a person 
authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal 
Government . . . ." 
 
A. In the district court's view, the government was 
required to prove only that "the Defendant intended to 
interfere with a proceeding (that happened to be a federal 
proceeding) or interfere with communication to a law 
enforcement officer (who happened to be a federal law 
enforcement officer)." Dist. Ct. Op. at 7. If the government 
had presented evidence that it was contemplated that 
Proctor would testify in a federal proceeding, the jury could 
easily have inferred that at least one of the proceedings 
with which Bell intended to interfere would have been 
federal. But there was no federal proceeding contemplated 
at the time of Proctor's murder.2 Similarly, if the 
government had presented evidence that at the time of her 
murder Proctor was cooperating in an ongoing federal 
investigation, the jury could easily have inferred that at 
least one of the law-enforcement-officer communications 
that Bell intended to prevent would have been with a 
federal officer. But, while federal officers were involved in 
the Task Force investigation, there is no evidence that 
Proctor had been providing information to a federal officer 
or to an officer authorized to act on behalf of the federal 
government. 
 
Accordingly, in this case, as in United States v. 
Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909 (3d Cir. 1996), we must rely on 
circumstantial evidence to decide whether the jury could 
have concluded that at least one of the law-enforcement- 
officer communications that Bell intended to prevent would 
have been with a federal officer. In Stansfield, the 
defendant believed that one Hoffman had told the 
authorities that Stansfield had burned down his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The government contends that "federal proceedings were, in fact, 
contemplated as the result of the victim's discussions with Special Agent 
Diller. (App. Vol. 2, pp. 45, 46)." Govt. Br. at 23. Diller's testimony does 
not bear this characterization. He did not say anything that can be 
construed to mean that the Task Force had already decided at the time 
of Proctor's murder to make a federal case out of the drug trade in which 
Tyler, Bell, and others were engaged, or that it had even thought about 
doing so. 
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(Stansfield's) house to collect the insurance money. 
Stansfield threatened, beat up, and attempted to kill 
Hoffman and Hoffman's parents. On appeal, Stansfield 
argued that his conviction for witness tampering could not 
stand because there was insufficient evidence that he had 
intended to hinder Hoffman's communications with a 
federal law enforcement officer. Id. at 917. 
 
Stansfield argued that the government was required to 
prove "an intent to prevent the communication of 
information to some particular law enforcement officer" who 
was, in fact, a federal officer. Id. at 918. The government 
countered that all it had to prove was that "the offense 
about which the defendant wishe[d] to prevent 
communications [was] actually a federal offense." Id. We 
rejected Stansfield's interpretation, but noted as well that 
"the position of the government [was not] without 
problems." Id. We expressed concern that if we demanded 
"only that the government prove that the underlying offense 
is federal and that the defendant intended to prevent the 
witness from communicating with law enforcement officers 
in general . . . we would essentially vitiate an important 
facet of the intent requirement of the statute." Id. We set 
forth the following formulation of the elements of 
§ 1512(a)(1)(C): 
 
[T]he government must prove: (1) the defendant killed 
or attempted to kill a person; (2) the defendant was 
motivated by a desire to prevent the communication 
between any person and law enforcement authorities 
concerning the commission or possible commission of 
an offense; (3) that offense was actually a federal 
offense; and (4) the defendant believed that the person 
in (2) above might communicate with the federal 
authorities. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
In view of the statute's clear command that the 
government need not prove any "state of mind" on the part 
of the defendant with respect to the federal character of the 
proceeding or officer, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f), we do not read 
the italicized passage as requiring proof that the defendant 
believed the victim might communicate with law 
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enforcement officers whom the defendant knew or believed 
to be federal officers. Rather, we read this sentence as 
recognizing that what the statute mandates is proof that 
the officers with whom the defendant believed the victim 
might communicate would in fact be federal officers.3 
 
Our interpretation is buttressed by the Stansfield court's 
explanation that "[t]his last element may be inferred by the 
jury from the fact that the offense was federal in nature, 
plus additional appropriate evidence." Id. If an offense 
constitutes a federal crime, it is more likely that an officer 
investigating it would be a federal officer, but an offense's 
status as a federal crime has no relationship with the 
defendant's subjective belief about the individual 
investigating it. Our reading of Stansfield is further 
confirmed by an examination of the dissent in that case. 
The dissent would have ordered the entry of a judgment of 
acquittal because the evidence revealed "no way to 
conclude that Stansfield either believed that a federal 
investigation was underway or could possibly have been 
aware of the potential for a federal investigation." Id. at 924 
(Lewis, J., dissenting). The dissent thus clearly framed the 
issue as whether the defendant must know or intend that 
the law-enforcement-officer communications which he 
seeks to prevent would be with federal officers. Because of 
the majority's conclusion that such federal-specific 
knowledge or intent was not required, the dissent charged 
that the majority had "essentially eviscerate[d] the intent 
element of the statute." Id. at 923 (Lewis, J., dissenting). 
 
Accordingly, we believe that the law of this circuit after 
Stansfield is that the government must prove that at least 
one of the law-enforcement-officer communications which 
the defendant sought to prevent would have been with a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We do not mean to imply that the victim and the witness or informant 
-- the person murdered and the person whom the murderer intended to 
prevent from communicating with the authorities -- must be one and the 
same. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) seems to apply as well to a situation 
where the defendant kills one person at least in part to set an 
intimidating example to dissuade another person or persons from 
communicating to the authorities. See id. ("Whoever kills or attempts to 
kill another person, with intent to . . . prevent the communication by any 
person to a law enforcement officer . . . .") (emphases added). 
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federal officer, but that the government is not obligated to 
prove that the defendant knew or intended anything with 
respect to this federal involvement. As Stansfield explained, 
the government may carry this burden by showing that the 
conduct which the defendant believed would be discussed 
in these communications constitutes a federal offense, so 
long as the government also presents "additional 
appropriate evidence." Id. at 918. 
 
B. The questions upon which the disposition of this 
appeal turns, then, are: (1) whether the jury could have 
concluded that at least part of Bell's motivation in killing 
Proctor was to prevent Proctor from communicating further 
with the Task Force; and (2) if so, whether the jury could 
have concluded that at least one of Proctor's further 
communications with the Task Force would have been with 
a federal officer. 
 
We have no hesitation in answering the first question in 
the affirmative. In Stansfield, the government's case 
appears to have been based solely on the law-enforcement- 
officer-communication part of the statute. Here, in contrast, 
the government has emphasized the official-proceeding 
subsection (despite the fact that § 1512 clearly would not 
apply if Bell's sole motivation in killing Proctor was to 
prevent her from testifying at Tyler's trial, because that 
state-court trial does not qualify as an "official proceeding"). 
Nevertheless, the government also alleged in the indictment 
and submitted to the jury the theory that Bell killed Proctor 
to prevent her from communicating with law enforcement 
officers. (App. 62A, 70A, 72A-73A; 561-62, 565-66, 586-87) 
 
We are satisfied that, while the evidence may lend itself 
more obviously to the theory that Bell killed Proctor in 
order to prevent her from testifying a few hours later at 
Tyler's trial, it also supports the inference that Bell believed 
Proctor was going to continue to communicate with the 
Task Force concerning drug crimes that Bell and others 
had committed. It is undisputed that, as a result of 
Proctor's information and testimony, an individual named 
Mary Jane Hodge had been convicted of drug offenses, and 
that at the time of her murder Proctor was scheduled to 
testify against two other drug defendants besides Tyler. 
(App. 54-57) The Task Force had not at that point begun an 
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investigation of Bell, but it is undisputed that Proctor "was 
still providing information about the drug trade in the 
Carlisle area at the time and also Harrisburg," a drug trade 
in which Bell was personally and heavily involved. (App. 57) 
 
We hold that it was reasonable for the jury to infer that 
Bell feared that Proctor's continued cooperation with the 
Task Force would have resulted in additional 
communications with law enforcement officers concerning 
drug crimes committed by Bell, among others, and that at 
least part of Bell's motivation in killing Proctor was to 
prevent such communications. The evidence is thus 
sufficient to support a finding that Bell killed Proctor not 
only to protect her boyfriend, Tyler, but also to protect 
herself, because there is evidence that Bell was at least as 
heavily implicated as Tyler in the drug trade for which Tyler 
was on trial. (App. 300, 435-36, 451) 
 
We also believe that the second question requires an 
affirmative answer. The government clearly presented 
sufficient evidence to entitle the jury to conclude that Bell 
killed Proctor; we have held that the jury could have found 
that Bell was motivated at least in part by a desire to 
prevent Proctor from communicating with the Task Force 
concerning the commission or possible commission of 
offenses; and those offenses (drug crimes) are clearly 
federal offenses. See Stansfield, 101 F.3d at 918. Bell, like 
Stansfield, "had knowledge of [Proctor's] past cooperation 
and was aware that some investigation, though not 
necessarily a federal one, was underway." Id. at 919. The 
Stansfield court noted that it was unclear whether 
Stansfield knew that a federal investigation had been 
opened. Id. Similarly, it is unclear whether Bell knew that 
the Task Force was a joint federal-state effort, but it is clear 
that it in fact was. As in Stansfield, the evidence does not 
indicate that Bell intended to prevent Proctor from 
communicating with a particular officer or officers, but 
rather with the Task Force generally. 
 
We hold that it was reasonable for the jury to infer that 
if Proctor had continued to cooperate with a partially 
federal law enforcement body regarding conduct 
constituting federal crimes, at least one of her 
communications would have been to a federal officer or to 
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an officer authorized to act on behalf of the federal 
government.4 The jury thus could reasonably have found 
that Bell killed Proctor "with intent to . . . prevent the 
communication by [Proctor] to a law enforcement officer . . . 
of the United States of information relating to the 
commission or possible commission of a Federal offense." 
18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C). Contrary to the criticism 
expressed by the dissent in Stansfield, this conclusion does 
not render the defendant's intent "irrelevant." See 101 F.3d 
at 922 (Lewis, J., dissenting). Rather, it respects fully the 
statute's requirement that the defendant intend to prevent 
a communication to a law enforcement officer, as well as its 
requirement that such officer be, in fact, a federal officer. 
What our analysis renders irrelevant is the defendant's 
"mental state" regarding the fact that the officer is a federal 





We next address Bell's challenge to the district court's 
jury charge with respect to the intent requirement of the 
tampering counts. The court gave the jury a supplemental 




4. Beyond stating our conclusion that the additional evidence presented 
in this case (in particular, that the Task Force was a joint federal-state 
effort that had developed federal cases in the past) constitutes 
"additional appropriate evidence" of the sort mandated by Stansfield, 101 
F.3d at 918, we express no opinion as to what types and what quantum 
of evidence satisfy that standard, which by its nature will require careful, 
case-by-case analysis. 
 
5. Bell's argument that the federal government lacks jurisdiction to try 
her for these crimes is founded upon her contention that the evidence 
reveals no nexus between her charged conduct and any federal interest. 
In light of our conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Bell's 
convictions for tampering with a federal informant, we reject her 
jurisdictional argument. Similarly, Bell's sufficiency argument as to the 
conspiracy and gun charges depends upon the success of her sufficiency 
challenge to the tampering counts. We therefore find this argument as 
well to be meritless. 
 
                                10 
defendant intended to frustrate a future judicial 
proceeding, and in parentheses that would turn out to 
be a federal proceeding . . . . 
 
[Y]ou would have to find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant intended to frustrate a future 
judicial proceeding. You would also have to conclude 
that that proceeding would be a federal proceeding, but 
you don't have to find that the defendant knew that it 
would be a federal proceeding. 
 
(App. 586) Bell argues that this charge "watered down" the 
intent requirement by "shift[ing] the jury's focus to deciding 
whether it was possible that the victim could relay 
information to federal law enforcement, rather than to the 
proper inquiry -- the intent of the Defendant . . . ." Bell Br. 
at 29 (emphasis in original). 
 
This argument is meritless. The quoted instruction did 
nothing more than explain 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1) and (2)'s 
express provision that the government need not prove any 
state of mind on the part of the defendant with respect to 
the federal character of the proceeding or law-enforcement- 
officer communication that it alleges she intended to 




In sentencing Bell to life imprisonment, the district court 
followed the pre-sentence report's recommendation and 
applied U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1(a), the guideline for first-degree 
murder. Bell contends that since the jury did not find that 
her killing of Proctor constituted first-degree murder, it was 
error for the district court to sentence her based on the 
first-degree murder guideline rather than the second-degree 
guideline. 
 
The provision under which Bell was sentenced, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512(a)(2)(A), incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 1111's definition of 
murder, and provides that a conviction for tampering-by- 
killing shall be punished by death or life imprisonment if 
the killing constitutes murder under § 1111, and shall be 
punished in accordance with § 1112 (the manslaughter 
statute) if it is any other kind of killing. Here the district 
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court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Bell's 
conduct fit the definition of first-degree murder set forth in 
18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). (App. 21A-30A) Bell argues that it was 
a violation of due process for the district court, as opposed 
to the jury, to make this determination. 
 
We are unpersuaded by this argument, but we need not 
resolve it definitively. Even if Bell should have been found 
to have committed second-degree rather than first-degree 
murder, it would not affect her sentence. Title 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512(a)(2)(A) provides that the punishment shall be death 
or life imprisonment where the "killing" constitutes murder, 
regardless of whether it is first-degree or second-degree 
murder. Bell does not argue that the "killing" here should 




For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 
conviction and sentence entered by the district court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Bell also reiterates the double jeopardy, collateral estoppel, and 
selective prosecution arguments that were rejected by the district court. 
The dual sovereigns doctrine has long foreclosed Bell's argument that the 
federal government may not prosecute her for the same conduct of which 
she was acquitted in state court, and Bell fails in her attempt to fit this 
case into the "Bartkus exception" to that doctrine. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 
359 U.S. 121 (1959). The same defect -- no identity of parties -- dooms 
Bell's collateral estoppel argument. Finally, Bell's selective prosecution 
argument is frivolous. No such claim lies unless Bell can make out a 
difficult prima facie showing that she was selected for prosecution for an 
invidious reason such as her race, her religion, or her exercise of 
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 
608 (1985). The only motive so much as hinted at here -- that the 
federal government chose to prosecute Bell after her state court acquittal 
because it did not want her to get away with murder -- is far from 
invidious. 
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